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A 60" day in March seems warm to a resident of Minneapolis, but to a resident 
of Miami, such a day seems chilly. Someone earning $30,000 feels rich when 
she lands a job that pays $50,000, but someone who earns $70,000 feels poor 
when her income declines to $50,000. And whereas an American living in a 
one-room house with no electricity or running water feels ashamed of his cir- 
cumstances, a villager in Nepal views his similar dwelling with pride. 
It is well known to most social and behavioral  scientists that satisfaction 
depends not just on absolute levels of consumption, but also on the context in 
which they occur. Yet economists have, for the most part, continued to model 
behavior as if  utility depended only on absolute consumption. As I and many 
others  have argued elsewhere,  the policy  implications  of conventional  eco- 
nomic models often differ sharply from those in which utility depends also on 
context.' In this essay, I explore the implications of the broader model for how 
we should finance social services like health care, education, child care, and 
long-term care. But before turning to the specifics of these issues, I will briefly 
review some of the evidence that utility depends on relative consumption. 
6.1  Concerns about Relative Position 
If we adopt the biologist's  view that human motivation was shaped by the 
forces of natural selection, it is no surprise that people might care so strongly 
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about relative resource holdings. Even in a famine, for example, there is always 
some food available, and the question of who gets it is settled largely by rela- 
tive wealth holdings. Relative wealth holdings have also been a decisive factor 
in the allocation of mates, especially in early human societies. Polygyny was 
practiced in nearly 1,000 of the 1,154 current and past societies for which data 
are available, and in  these  societies  it  was almost  invariably  the  wealthiest 
males who took multiple wives.* 
Concern about relative position is also adaptive insofar as it prods people to 
monitor how they  are doing relative to their rivals  and to boost  their effort 
levels  if  they  start falling behind. The alternative of operating at maximum 
effort levels at all times is less efficient because people tend to do better by 
conserving their energy when environmental conditions are not stressful, for 
use when the threats to survival are more immediate. 
Concern about relative wealth is helpful even in interpersonal  bargaining 
contexts. Consider, for example, an elegant experiment known as the “ultima- 
tum  bargaining  game” (see Guth, Schmittberger,  and Schwarze  1982). The 
game is played by two players,  Proposer and Responder. It begins with Pro- 
poser being given a sum of money (say, $100) that he must then propose how 
to divide between himself and Responder. Responder then has two options: (1) 
he can accept, in which case each party gets the amount proposed; or (2) he 
can refuse, in which case each party gets zero and the $100 goes back to the ex- 
perimenter. 
If  Proposer believes that Responder cares only about absolute wealth, his 
own wealth-maximizing  strategy is clear: he should propose $99 for himself 
and $1 for Responder (only integer dollar amounts are allowed). If Proposer’s 
assumption about Responder is correct, Responder will accept this one-sided 
offer because he will reason that getting $1 is better than getting nothing. 
But suppose Proposer believed that Responder cares not only about absolute 
but also relative wealth levels. Because he finds the relative terms of the one- 
sided offer so distasteful,  Responder  might  then refuse  it,  even  though  he 
stands to gain from it in absolute terms. The irony is that the effect of Propos- 
er’s believing that Responder cares about relative wealth is to boost substan- 
tially  the amount that Proposer  offers Responder.  By  virtue of  his concern 
about relative wealth, Responder becomes a much more effective bargainer. 
People also have good reasons to be concerned about their relative position 
in the income hierarchy even when they do not care how their own consump- 
tion compares to others’. As Amartya Sen has emphasized, for example, com- 
munity  wealth  levels are an important  determinant of the capabilities-and 
hence the amount of wealth-an  individual needs to be an effectively function- 
ing member of society (Sen  1983, 1987). Because virtually everyone in Los 
2. See Wright 1994. Although food shortages and polygyny were common in the environment 
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Angeles has a car, a resident of that city cannot meet even the most minimal 
social and employment obligations without one. Yet  no one expects an Ethio- 
pian villager to be able to transport himself across comparable distances at a 
moment’s notice. 
By the same token, there are many goods that are highly desirable in their 
own right, yet whose supplies are such that only the wealthiest people can have 
them, no matter how much national income grows. The late Fred Hirsch (1976) 
called these “positional goods.” If everyone has the same preference for a home 
with a commanding  view, and only  10% of the homes in the area have that 
feature, those homes will go to families in the upper decile of the wealth distri- 
bution, no matter how much everyone earns. 
Of even more pressing concern is the desire of most parents to prepare their 
children to have successful lives and careers once they leave home. Positional 
issues arise here because  a “good job,” like a fast runner, is an inescapably 
relative concept. It is a job that offers more responsibility, better working con- 
ditions, more opportunities for growth, and higher pay than other jobs. Increas- 
ingly, entry-level jobs on the most desirable career paths go the applicants with 
the best educational credentials (see Frank and Cook 1995, chap. 8). This gives 
parents a compelling reason to make sure that their children meet or exceed 
community  educational  standards,  which,  in  turn,  requires  high  relative 
income. 
Michael  McGuire and his collaborators  have  shown that relative position 
may  even  affect  fundamental  biochemical  processes  in  the nervous  system 
(McGuire, Raleigh, and Brammer 1982; Raleigh et al. 1984). In a study involv- 
ing nineteen groups of adult vervet monkeys, Raleigh et al. (1984) found that 
the dominant member in each group had roughly 50% higher concentrations 
of the neurotransmitter serotonin, which affects mood and behavior in a variety 
of ways. They also showed that this difference was the effect, rather than the 
cause, of high ~tatus.~ 
Within limits, having elevated serotonin concentrations  is associated with 
enhanced feelings of well-being?  Serotonin deficiencies  are associated with 
sleep  disorders,  irritability,  and  antisocial  behavior.  McGuire  and  his  col- 
leagues also found elevated serotonin levels in the leaders of college fraterni- 
ties and athletic teams. 
3. To do this, they removed the initially dominant animal from each group and placed him in an 
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after roughly seventy-two hours passed, serotonin concentrations in the newly dominant animal 
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Additional  evidence  on the  importance of relative position  comes in  the 
form of happiness surveys conducted over time in a variety of countries. These 
surveys, which  ask people to report whether  they  are “very happy,” “fairly 
happy,” or “not happy,” find that happiness levels within a country at a given 
moment  are strongly positively correlated with position  in the country’s in- 
come distribution. The same studies find no long-term  trends in average re- 
ported happiness levels, even for countries whose incomes have been growing 
steadily over time. Looking at different countries at a given point of time, the 
happiness surveys also find little relationship between the average income level 
in a country and the average happiness level reported by its  citizen^.^ 
These survey findings are thus consistent with the view that relative position 
is a much more important determinant of self-rated happiness levels than is 
absolute position on the income scale. Even though happiness surveys call for 
purely subjective responses, there is evidence that they measure a real phenom- 
enon. For example, numerous other studies have found strong positive relation- 
ships between reported happiness levels and observable physiological and be- 
havioral measures of well-being. People who report that they are not happy, for 
example, are more likely to experience headaches, rapid heartbeat, digestive 
disorders, and related ailments (Bradburn and No11 1969). Self-reported happi- 
ness is strongly negatively related to clinical symptoms of depression, irritabil- 
ity, and anxiety (Bachman et al. 1967; Wall, Clegg, and Jackson  1978). Those 
who rate themselves as very happy are more likely than others to initiate social 
contacts with friends (Bradburn and Caplovitz  1965). People who call them- 
selves unhappy  have higher  labor turnover than others (McEvoy and Cascio 
1985). Self-reported happiness is also linked to longevity (Palmore 1969) and 
coronary heart disease (Sales and House 1971). 
One final piece of  evidence of the strength of concerns about relative posi- 
tion comes from observations of the wage structure within  firms. Traditional 
theory  says that individual  wage differentials  will mirror the corresponding 
differences in marginal productivity. Yet in virtually every case for which the 
relevant data are available, the wage distribution within the firm is substantially 
compressed relative to the corresponding  marginal  productivity  distribution. 
The patterns of wage compression, moreover, are consistent with the claim that 
individual wage payments within the firm incorporate  substantial compensat- 
ing differentials based on local rank (see Frank 1985a, chap. 4). 
To sum up, evidence from several disciplines strongly suggests that relative 
economic position is an important determinant of human satisfaction. Let us 
now consider the implications  of positional  concerns for the methods  of fi- 
nancing social services. 
5. Richard Easterlin (1995) reports that a positive relationship between happiness and income 
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6.2  Health Care 
Real health care expenditures per capita in the United States have grown 
more rapidly than real GNP per capita for as long as the relevant data have 
allowed us to measure (see Newhouse 1992,4).  As a share of GNP, health care 
costs have risen from only 4% in 1940 to nearly  14% today. 
As Baumol and Bowen explained almost thirty years ago (1966), at least 
some of this increase was simply to have been expected. In the performing 
arts, education, health care, and other service industries, productivity  grows 
much more slowly than in agriculture and manufacturing. This implies that the 
prices of services, measured in units of manufactured goods, must steadily rise. 
This does not mean, however, that we literally cannot afford to buy the same 
services we had in the past. In a recent paper,  Baumol (1993) stresses that, 
with  rising productivity  in manufacturing  and with  constant productivity  in 
services, we can afford even more services than before. 
Yet spiraling medical costs go beyond lagging productivity in the health care 
industry. Also implicated have been the expansion of access to medical services 
through Medicare and Medicaid; increasing reliance on insurance and other 
third-party payment schemes in the private sector; the growing tendency for 
physicians to specialize; the rise in malpractice litigation; and especially the 
rapid introduction of costly diagnostic and therapeutic technologies (Feldstein 
1971, 1977; Fuchs 1990; Weisbrod 1991). 
Whatever the causes of  escalating medical costs, one of their effects has 
been  to place medical insurance increasingly beyond the reach of low- and 
middle-income Americans, whose real incomes have stagnated for the past two 
decades. Nearly 40 million Americans, most of them from low- and middle- 
income groups, are currently uninsured. Although most people favor the provi- 
sion of universal medical coverage in some form, the budgetary dilemma is 
that better access means significantly increased usage of medical services and, 
in turn, even greater escalation in expenditures. 
Why is this really a dilemma? Perhaps the value we receive from increased 
expenditures  on medical  care is  at least  as great as we could expect from 
greater spending on other things. On examination, however, this does not ap- 
pear to be the case. As Victor Fuchs has repeatedly emphasized, for example, 
there is no persuasive evidence that mortality and morbidity vary significantly 
with expenditures on medical care.6 
To  explain why, he begins by  noting that most health care systems deliver 
those medical interventions that are known to save lives and are relatively inex- 
pensive-antibiotics  for serious infections, surgical removal of inflamed ap- 
pendixes, and so on. Variations in expenditures tend to be accounted for by 
differences in expenditures that do not greatly affect major health outcomes. 
6.  A brief summary of  his argument is contained in Fuchs 1994. 180  Robert H. Frank 
For example, systems vary substantially in the extent to which they administer 
treatment for essentially self-limiting conditions like colds, headaches, sprains, 
cuts, bruises, and gastrointestinal upsets. 
Further variations come in areas for which there is no consensus on which 
treatment is best. Thus, for example, Canadian heart-attack victims are gener- 
ally treated  with the enzyme streptokinase,  whereas American  patients will 
generally be given the much more expensive TPA, even though there is little 
evidence that TPA works any better. 
Fuchs concedes that there are some instances in which expensive treatments 
are known to make a significant difference in major health outcomes, but he 
notes that these cases make up only a minuscule proportion of total expendi- 
tures on health care. Further evidence for Fuchs’s general claim comes from a 
recent study by Manning et al. (1987), who found that insurance policies with 
a  large  deductible provision  produced between  40  and 50% reductions in 
health care expenditures with no measurable differences in health outcomes. 
Fuchs has also stressed, however, that health care systems deliver more than 
just medically effective interventions. They deliver care to the sick, even when 
they do not cure them; and they also serve to validate the claims of seriously 
ill or disabled persons for support from others. We must also inquire whether 
these important functions might be seriously compromised by efforts to hold 
expenditures in check. 
One of the most common means for curtailing expenditure growth has been 
the  move  from private  fee-for-service  physicians  to prepaid  group practice 
plans.  In  one early  study, Richard Tessler  and David  Mechanic (1975) at- 
tempted to compare satisfaction levels for consumers under these alternative 
arrangements.  They found that, although most consumers in the two groups 
reported being “very satisfied” with their medical services, satisfaction levels 
were marginally lower in the prepaid group plans. 
Because of positional concerns, however, even this small difference proba- 
bly overstates the cost of a societywide move to less expensive methods of 
delivering health care. Whether a consumer is dissatisfied when he is told he 
must wait three weeks for an MRI of his tennis elbow will depend, after all, 
on how long he expected to have to wait. Canada has fewer high-tech diagnos- 
tic  devices than the United States, which  results  in higher  utilization  rates, 
lower costs, and longer waiting times for nonemergency  patients  in Canada. 
But since the longer waiting times apply equally to all, they do not appear to 
be a matter of particular concern to Canadian consumers. 
In what follows, I will assume that important health outcomes are at most 
only weakly  related to total expenditures on health  care and that consumer 
satisfaction with health care services depends not just on the absolute quality 
of those services, but also on their relative quality. My point is not that people 
envy those who receive better care or take pleasure  from the fact that they 
receive better care than others. Rather, it is that subjective evaluations of the 
adequacy of care are context-dependent. By “context,” I have in mind the com- 181  Consumption Externalities and Social Services 
parison between one person's services and another's,  and the comparison  be- 
tween current services and those enjoyed in the past. Under these assumptions, 
I will now compare the following two alternative health care finance plans with 
respect to their prospects for holding expenditure growth in check: 
Plan 1. Universal membership in a basic, no-frills health insurance plan 
is financed out of general tax revenues. Consumers are free to  join more 
elaborate plans that include amenities like private hospital rooms, ac- 
cess to new and experimental technologies, or older technologies with 
low benefit-cost ratios; but they must pay the full cost of the alternative 
plan completely out of pocket. 
Plan 2. A tax-financed voucher is issued to every consumer in the amount 
required to purchase membership in plan 1. People may then either  join 
plan  1 or supplement their voucher with their own funds to purchase 
membership in more elaborate plans. 
Plan  1 is analogous to the existing method of financing education in most 
jurisdictions in the United  States. Parents  can send their  students  to  public 
schools financed out of tax revenues, or they can send them to private schools 
by paying the full private tuition out of pocket. Plan 2 resembles recent propos- 
als to fund schooling through a voucher system. These proposals allow parents 
to send their children to private schools by paying only the difference between 
the voucher and the current private school tuition. 
The essential difference between the two plans is captured by a comparison 
of the budget constraints they present to a representative family faced with the 
choice of how much health care to buy. Figure 6.1 shows a family with a pretax 
income of  X  and assumes that health care services can be produced at a con- 
stant cost of 4,  per unit. Under plan 1, each family pays Tin  health care taxes 
and  is then  entitled to Q, = T/P, units of medical services without  further 
payment. If it wants to enroll in a private plan that offers more than Q, units of 
medical services, it must quit the public plan and enroll in the private plan at 
a cost of P,,, per unit. The budget constraint facing a family under plan 1 is thus 
the locus ABCD in figure 6.1. The kink at B represents the fact that, to improve 
upon the basic plan, the family must essentially forfeit its entitlement to ser- 
vices under the basic plan and start purchasing  medical services from scratch 
in the private sector. Thus, to purchase just one more unit of medical services 
beyond the basic plan, it must pay not P,,,, but T + P,,,. This is a sharp disincen- 
tive to expand beyond the basic plan, and, for the indifference map shown, the 
family's  optimal choice is to stick with the basic plan (represented by point B 
in fig. 6.1). 
Under the voucher system of plan 2, the family's  budget constraint  is the 
locus ABF in figure 6.1. By essentially  rebating  the family's  tax payment  T 
in the form of a voucher, this plan enables the family to expand its coverage 
beyond the basic plan by spending only Pn,  for each additional unit of  cover- 182  Robert H. Frank 
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Fig. 6.1  Financial incentives under two health plans 
age. Again  for the indifference  map shown, the  family’s best  option  under 
these terms is to expand its coverage by purchasing bundle E, which contains 
Q2 > Q, units of medical services. What is clear, then, is that many families- 
possibly  the vast majority of  families-would  purchase  significantly higher 
quantities of medical services under plan 2 than under plan  1. 
Under conventional economic models, in which satisfaction depends only 
on absolute consumption, this would be a difference of no concern, since fami- 
lies who elect more elaborate coverage would be paying the full social cost of 
the added coverage.’ But things look different if satisfaction also depends on 
relative consumption. The fact that the voucher plan induces many families to 
purchase  more elaborate coverage now becomes a matter of social concern, 
since a direct effect of  their action is to reduce the satisfaction of consumers 
who stick with the basic plan. 
Once enough consumers enroll in more elaborate health plans, features that 
were once considered special amenities in those plans will come, over time, to 
be viewed as essential. People are troubled by inequality in virtually any form, 
but few forms elicit such strong reactions as the perception of unequal access 
to “essential” medical services. In a democratic system like ours, the resulting 
dissatisfaction  would translate  into irresistible political pressures to upgrade 
the basic plan. 
7.  Peltzman (1973) has argued that our current method of financing public education causes 
many people to spend too little on education. On this view, the spending increase prompted by the 
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Families would then be confronted  with the option of upgrading  the new, 
more generous, basic plan by  supplementing their vouchers at the margin as 
before. Many would undoubtedly do so, and political pressure to upgrade the 
basic plan would begin anew. The voucher plan thus promises to set in motion 
a dynamic process that would cause even more rapid escalation in health ex- 
penditures than we have witnessed in recent decades. 
In  view  of  the evidence  that  spending  more on health  care does little to 
change important health outcomes, and little to enhance consumer satisfaction 
in the long run, the voucher plan seems a very poor bargain indeed. Under the 
nonvoucher plan, by contrast, there is a much clearer prospect of being able to 
hold the growth of medical expenditures in check. 
Of course, these are not the only two plans on the table. Victor Fuchs, for 
example, favors a third option, in which everyone would be enrolled in a basic 
plan and then allowed to purchase supplementary coverage out of pocket. The 
desirability of this option depends critically on the price at which supplemen- 
tary coverage is made available. For example, if families are permitted to sup- 
plement their basic coverage at marginal private cost, this option becomes es- 
sentially the same as what I have characterized as the voucher plan. And if the 
basic plan were truly a no-frills plan, most families would indeed be likely to 
upgrade on these terms.  So just like the voucher plan,  the basic-care-with- 
optional-upgrades  plan  would engage the  social escalation  process just de- 
scribed. 
At the same time, Fuchs’s proposal has undeniable appeal. Having grown 
accustomed to deluxe medical coverage under our current system, many, if not 
most, middle-income families might be unwilling to move to a no-frills plan. 
(If required to move, however, their initial dissatisfaction would diminish over 
time  as  the  new  context  became  the  norm.)  But  political  decisions  are 
grounded largely in the here and now, and without some way of adding supple- 
mentary coverage short of  starting from scratch, plan  1 might be a political 
nonstarter. Fortunately, a continuum of  plans between plans  1 and 2 are avail- 
able. What is important is that people not be allowed to upgrade the basic plan 
by paying only the marginal private cost of the additional features they add. 
A compromise plan, for example, might be like the original plan  1 except 
with more elaborate coverage. This would make it more expensive at first, but 
would retain the critical feature of  plan 1-namely,  its ability to contain pres- 
sure to escalate the basic plan’s coverage over time. Alternatively, a plan might 
be crafted along the lines Fuchs proposes:  people could be permitted to pur- 
chase additional features without starting from scratch, but only by paying pre- 
miums significantly larger than the marginal  private cost of those features.8 
8. In cases where the marginal costs of additional services are lower than their average costs, 
the sellers’ need to cover total costs might independently necessitate a requirement to charge more 
than marginal cost for upgrade features. Whether an additional premium is warranted would then 
depend on the strength of the consumption externalities to which the purchase of these features 
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Thus, for example, if the marginal private cost of adding a rider that provided 
access to experimental  therapies  were $1,00O/year, that rider could be made 
available at a charge of, say, $2,000. The central design goal should be to come 
up with a plan that can attract and maintain the allegiance of a sufficiently 
large majority that its features become the norm. For once large numbers of 
consumers elect coverage significantly  beyond what is included in the basic 
plan, that plan ceases to be seen as “adequate” and hence becomes politically 
unsustainable. 
6.3  Education 
The question of how best to finance education raises many issues similar to 
the ones just discussed for health care. Like health care, for example, education 
is a service industry in which expenditures in real terms have sharply outpaced 
secular growth in real output. There is also some evidence that important edu- 
cational outcomes do not improve significantly with increases in expenditure 
per pupil (see, e.g., Hanushek  1986). And perhaps even more so than  in the 
case of  health  care, the adequacy of  a system of education is perceived  in 
essentially relative terms. 
As noted, the current method for financing education in most jurisdictions 
is like the health plan  1 just discussed. Public schools are financed out of tax 
revenues, and parents who want to send their children to private schools must 
pay full market tuition out of pocket. The principal  alternative to the current 
system is a voucher system essentially like the health plan  2 just discussed. 
Under this alternative, parents  are given a school voucher that may be used 
either to enroll their children in a public  school, or, with appropriate out-of- 
pocket supplements, to enroll them in a private school. 
By making  it possible  to purchase small upgrades  in educational quality 
without having to buy private schooling from scratch, the voucher plan would 
undoubtedly  lead many families to spend more on education than is currently 
spent in the public schools. And since education, like medical care, is an arena 
in which positional concerns operate with special force, a static voucher would 
be difficult to sustain once substantial numbers of families had upgraded. The 
potential  for  expenditure escalation  is  thus  precisely  the  same  under  the 
voucher method of financing education as it is under the voucher method for 
financing health care. 
Before rejecting  the  voucher  proposals in  education, however,  there  are 
some important differences between the two arenas that deserve close scrutiny. 
Most important, despite all the legitimate criticism about limited access to the 
American  health care system, few deny that the quality of care it delivers is 
among the  best  in  the world.  By  contrast, the American  system  of  public 
schooling  ranks near the bottom of industrialized  nations on virtually every 
important measure (see Chubb and Moe 1990). In education, there is thus a 
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Moreover, there are persuasive arguments that the competition introduced 
by  a voucher system might  help solve many  of the problems that currently 
plague public schools (Chubb and Moe 1990). Parents’ inability to choose be- 
tween  schools, for example, means that public school bureaucrats  have little 
incentive to develop innovative educational programs or to take special steps 
to attract  and retain better  teachers.  Forcing  schools to compete for tuition 
dollars could significantly alter this picture. 
The question thus becomes, How can we inject additional competition into 
the educational arena without unleashing forces that might give rise to runaway 
escalation in expenditures? One solution might be to limit the applicability of 
the voucher to schools that held expenditures per pupil below some specified 
level.  In  functional terms,  this  would  be  similar  to existing  proposals  that 
vouchers be redeemable only in public schools. A less extreme measure, simi- 
lar to the intermediate health plan options discussed in the last section, would 
be to reduce the value of the voucher by some amount for each dollar of tuition 
the chosen school charged above a given threshold. 
Since there is no evidence that expenditures per pupil are too small under 
the current system, the policy challenge is to design a voucher scheme that will 
introduce greater competition among schools yet not induce most parents to 
supplement their vouchers. As with the health care voucher plan, any plan that 
induces substantial numbers of families to supplement their vouchers is almost 
certain to launch runaway cycles of expenditure growth. 
6.4  Child Care 
Child care, once the exclusive province of the private sector, moved into the 
governmental arena with the introduction of the Head Start program. Although 
this program continues to be targeted at the children of poor households, there 
is growing interest in expanded public funding for preschool  care programs 
more generally. This interest springs at least in part from the steadily growing 
labor-force participation  rates of women with preschool children. The labor- 
force participation  rate for mothers whose youngest child was three months 
old, for example, grew from less than 25% in 1975 to more than 50% in 1988 
(Klerman and Leibowitz 1994, fig. 1). 
To the extent that many parents are either unwilling or unable to purchase 
satisfactory child care on their own, there is a twofold case for greater govern- 
ment involvement. First, there is the issue of  social justice for the children 
involved.  Early childhood experience is known  to influence important  out- 
comes throughout life, and it seems grossly  unfair for society  to allow  the 
futures of large numbers of children to be seriously compromised through no 
fault of their own. And second, even if justice were not a concern, we have a 
strong  selfish interest  in limiting the number of  damaged people in society. 
Such people, after all, are more likely than others to become criminals or to 
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Suppose we grant, for the sake of discussion, a collective interest in making 
child care more available to those least able to afford it. What form should the 
government’s financial assistance take? As we did in the health care and educa- 
tion  cases, let us again suppose there are only two choices: (1) provision of 
basic services financed out of tax revenues; and (2)  issuance of a voucher that 
can be used, with out-of-pocket supplements if desired, to purchase child care 
in the marketplace. 
The first alternative invites the same set of problems  that currently plague 
our public schools. By facilitating greater competition between child care pro- 
viders, the voucher scheme would help avoid these problems. But to the extent 
that community standards provide the frame of reference that people use to 
evaluate the quality of the child care they purchase, the voucher scheme also 
invites  the  prospect of  sharply  escalating  expenditures  on child care. As in 
health care and education, if a substantial majority of parents  supplemented 
their  vouchers  to provide  more  elaborate facilities  for their  children,  these 
facilities would  gradually  become the norm, leading to political pressure  to 
raise the existing voucher. 
Whether this prospect is viewed as threatening depends on the social utility 
of additional expenditures on child care. In both health and education, we can 
be reasonably confident that we would not get much of value simply by spend- 
ing more. In the child care arena our experience is much more limited. If the 
current problem is that most people spend far too little on child care, additional 
pressure to spend more might be just what we need. Even if so, however, the 
voucher scheme has no built-in mechanism to prevent further escalation once 
expenditures reached the efficient level. 
As in the other arenas, many of the benefits of the voucher approach could 
be achieved by a modified plan that constrained parents’ ability to supplement 
the basic voucher. Vouchers could be made redeemable,  for example, only in 
programs that charged no more than the voucher amount. Or, more flexibly but 
with slightly more risk of expenditure escalation, parents could be permitted 
to supplement their vouchers at steep penalty rates. Thus, for example, if the 
basic voucher were for $500/month and parents enrolled their child in a $600/ 
month program,  they  might be required  to supplement their voucher not by 
$100, but by $200 or even $300. As before, the idea is to choose a sufficiently 
steep penalty that most people elect not to upgrade. 
6.5  Long-Term Care 
In the health, education, and child  care arenas, people have considerable 
direct  knowledge  of  community  consumption  standards.  For  this  reason, 
voucher plans that allow upgrading at private marginal cost create the risk of 
runaway expenditure escalation. By contrast, community standards are much 
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idea whether their friends and neighbors even have long-term care insurance, 
much less know the standard of care it might provide. Long-term care is thus 
an “unobservable good,” a term I have used elsewhere to describe goods for 
which direct social comparisons are of relatively little importance (see Frank 
1985a). 
Although the purchase of long-term care insurance is unobservable,  it and 
other unobservable  goods are nonetheless influenced indirectly by positional 
concerns. Suppose, for the sake of discussion, that goods are either observable 
or unobservable, and that interpersonal consumption comparisons occur only 
with respect to observable goods. Positional concerns will then lead people to 
devote too much of their budgets to observable goods, and too little to unob- 
servable goods. By this I mean that each person would obtain higher utility if 
all were to shift resources at the margin toward the purchase of unobservable 
goods9 
This theoretical prediction appears consistent with what we know about pri- 
vate purchase decisions regarding long-term care. People routinely insure their 
cars against theft and damage, even when they could cover such losses out of 
pocket without great difficulty, yet these same people generally do not insure 
against the loss of their earning power, a setback that few could handle satisfac- 
torily on their own. 
Unlike the health, education, and child care arenas, where voucher  plans 
threaten to push expenditures  out of control, the objective here is to induce 
consumers to devote more  of  their  resources  to long-term  care. A voucher 
scheme would serve this goal nicely. The problem with leaving long-term care 
strictly to the marketplace is that, when consumers decide individually to in- 
crease their spending on long-term care insurance, their spending on observ- 
able goods falls relative to other consumers. But when we decide collectively 
to spend more on such insurance, consumption of observables falls in tandem 
for all consumers, which means that no one suffers a decline in relative con- 
sumption of observables. 
Of course, even collective decisions to devote more resources to long-term 
care insurance necessarily entail absolute reductions in other categories of con- 
sumption. And to the extent that each individual’s own current consumption 
standards help define his personal frame of reference, such reductions will not 
be painless. The psychological  costs of  adjustment,  and hence the political 
costs of implementing the necessary  reforms,  are likely to be  smaller if the 
shift of resources toward long-term care insurance occurs gradually rather than 
all at once. 
9. Since health insurance is no  more observable than long-term care insurance, the analysis 
suggests a parallel tendency to spend too little on health insurance. This may help explain why 
some  15% of  all Americans, not all of  them poor,  currently have no health insurance. It  may 
also explain the tendency for most governments to provide some form of  social insurance for 
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6.6  Concluding Remarks 
Every scheme for financing the provision of social services contains incen- 
tives that affect individual  behavior. To  predict  how people will  respond  to 
given  methods  of financing  health care, education, child  care, or long-term 
care, we need reliable models of behavior. For this purpose, economists have 
generally  employed  models in  which  utility  depends only  on absolute  con- 
sumption. Yet there is abundant evidence that utility depends on relative con- 
sumption as well. 
I have argued that policies for financing social services have strikingly dif- 
ferent consequences under the two models. Positional concerns operate with 
special force in health care, education, and child care, and policy makers who 
fail to take these concerns into account will fail to anticipate the potential for 
runaway expenditures inherent in voucher schemes in these areas. By contrast, 
positional  concerns give  rise  to expenditure deficits  in  the long-term  care 
arena, and policy makers who ignore these concerns are unlikely to perceive 
the attraction of collective efforts to steer additional resources into this arena. 
If  the evidence for the existence  of positional  concerns is so compelling, 
why do analysts so seldom take these concerns into account? Some have re- 
sponded that, although people do care about relative position, they shouldn’r 
care about it, and policy makers should give these concerns no more weight 
than, say, the concerns of sadists.’O This is a curious position in view of the 
long utilitarian tradition in economics, which holds that a taste for poetry is no 
better than a taste for pushpins. But even if we reject envy itself as a proper 
basis for policy decisions, positional concerns often arise with great force even 
when envy plays no role. In any event, positional concerns are not going to go 
away. When we fail to take them into account, we often fail to achieve out- 
comes that everyone would prefer. 
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Comment  Amartya Sen 
Robert Frank’s paper is both interesting and insightful, and also of potential 
practical importance. The paper starts off in familiar territory-indeed  a terri- 
tory that Frank has done much to make familiar. Our sense of well-being de- 
pends greatly on our relative positions.‘ This important connection Frank ex- 
plores in assessing different ways of financing  health care, education,  child 
care, and long-term care. With this basic relativist consideration, Frank com- 
bines a few others: the observability of the relative  positions  occupied; the 
usefulness of channeling more resources into the respective fields; and the role 
of competition in fostering  efficiency  in each  area. I begin with presenting 
Frank’s main arguments in terms of these general considerations applied to the 
respective specific spheres. 
Basic Approaches and General Considerations 
There are two basic approaches in public funding of care. Plan 1 gives every- 
one an entitlement to some basic care, but if  someone chooses to have more 
care than that, then he or she must pay  the full cost of the alternative chosen 
(nothing is carried on from the basic care package). Under plan 2, however, 
each person is entitled to support to a fixed extent (given, for example, by the 
value of a “voucher”), and one could use it to purchase either the basic service 
Amartya Sen is the Lamont University Professor and professor of economics and philosophy at 
1. Frank (1985) is a far-reaching exploration of the relevance and reach of the relativist perspec- 
Harvard University. 
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or something more expensive (paying the difference). There are many interme- 
diate possibilities,  but  the  main  strategic contrast  is between  these  two ap- 
proaches. 
The effect of plan 2 is typically to raise the overall expenditure level, partic- 
ularly encouraged by  the desire of each to do as well and better than others; 
marginal additions can be made under plan 2 without losing the basic support, 
as would happen under plan  1. Supplementation by some would also make the 
others feel-and  be-worse  off. And it can generate pressure for upgrading 
the basic entitlement itself, so that the others do not feel left far behind the 
supplementers. Would this be a good thing? Frank argues that the answer must 
vary among the distinct fields. 
Health, Education, Child Care, and Long-Term Care 
When applied to health care, the expansion of medical expenditure resulting 
from plan 2 would not be all that productive, Frank argues, citing evidence of 
the ineffectiveness of additional medical expenditure in improving health or 
longevity (Fuchs’s works bear on this claim). This suggests that plan 2 is “a 
very poor bargain indeed”; plan  1 has a clear advantage in the field of health 
care. Some compromises are considered, including a hybrid plan proposed by 
Fuchs (1994), whereby the upgrading of services is made more costly, without 
going all the  way  to plan  1. But  intermediate plans  also have intermediate 
problems. 
In education, the same consideration  applies, but Frank sees less waste in 
upgrading  basic educational provisions in the United States (compared with 
that in health, where the general quality of care is already  very high). This 
makes the argument against plan 2 in education a little less powerful. A com- 
promise is sought, but with less of a full-blooded rejection of plan 2. 
When it comes to child care, the inflationary features of plan 2 remain, but 
the scope for more fruitful expenditure in this field appears to be very clear. 
And so is the effectiveness of more competition in raising efficiency, and this 
would be encouraged by plan 2. The balance of advantages now shifts some- 
what away from plan 1, moving in the direction of plan 2. 
Finally, when it comes to long-term care, there is not only a strong need for 
more money being spent on it, which makes plan 2 useful, but also the well- 
being effects of plan 2 are less austere. The relative increase of long-term care 
on the part of some families need not generate the sense of being “left behind” 
on the part of those not able to supplement the basic provision. This is because, 
argues Frank, this kind of care is largely “unobservable,” and the standards of 
care are not quite common knowledge. 
Variations and the Facts of the Case 
So it turns out, in this series of arguments, that Frank arrives at quite dzffer- 
ent conclusions about the right way of financing distinct types of cares (health, 
education, child care, and long-term). But the different recommendations are 192  Robert H. Frank 
all based on the same basic principles. Dissimilar conclusions result from vari- 
ations in the conditions that obtain. And this indeed is a great merit of Frank’s 
analysis, which is at once quite general (in terms of principles) and very spe- 
cific (in terms of applications).  Since the question is sometimes asked-explic- 
itly  or by  implication-why  the  same rules  should not  apply  in  different 
spheres of  social insurance and public  support, Frank’s line of analysis has 
much attraction: the rules have to be different to be faithful to the same basic 
principles. 
While I  see the force of Frank’s arguments, I shall not refrain from airing 
some mild grumbles. First, as far as health care is concerned, it is possible that 
Frank is somewhat overpessimistic about the effects of more resources going 
to health care. While the main defects of contemporary  health care arrange- 
ments in the United States clearly lie elsewhere (particularly in the absence of 
universal coverage and affordable health care for all), the statistics of longevity 
and health benefits can, to some extent, hide the positive impact of more health 
expenditure, particularly in reducing pain and suffering and in improving the 
quality of life. Also, even health care practices-not  just education and school- 
ing-can  improve with more competition and more learning from each other, 
and there is considerable evidence that even in the United States the level of 
care in different hospitals (for example, in radical surgery) varies a great deal. 
Frank’s overall conclusion may well be right, but there is some need to answer 
the counterarguments that can certainly be presented. 
Well-Being and Psychology 
Second, when Frank analyzes the effects of relative position on one’s well- 
being, he relies largely on the psychological sense of well-being (such as hap- 
piness, satisfaction, etc.) as the true indicator. In this sense, Frank’s approach 
has features  of classical utilitarianism. While he cites John Rawls (197 1) as 
dissenting from this view, Rawls’s counterarguments are not, in fact, terribly 
well presented here. Frank identifies Rawls’s position with the view that “pol- 
icy  makers  should  give  these  [relative position-based]  concerns no more 
weight  than, say, the concerns of sadists.” Rawls’s arguments (and those  of 
many other modem political philosophers) are less arbitrary than that. Rawls’s 
reasoning turns on rejecting the exclusive  status of subjective perceptions  in 
judging well-being. 
There are issues of real importance here. For example, consider a general 
diminution of  living conditions that reduces the quality of life and effective 
freedoms  of  all,  but  which  leaves  everyone’s  sense of  well-being  (based 
strongly on relativist perceptions) rather unchanged, since all have come down 
together. In terms of the purely subjectivist view of well-being (to which Frank 
seems largely to adhere), not much would seem to have been lost in this case. 
But this can be seriously questioned, since everyone is absolutely  more de- 
prived (for example, more hungry, more insecure, and so on), even though not 
so in relative terms. There is an issue here that needs addressing. 193  Consumption Externalities and Social Services 
Types of Relativities 
Finally, there is perhaps need for distinguishing  among the different ways 
in which  “relative”  concerns figure in influencing our perceptions,  effective 
freedoms, and welfare. There is, first of all, relativity in commanding commod- 
ities: the competition for the same facilities in which more absolute purchasing 
power of some would mean less relative entitlement of others. For example, in 
the fight for entitlement over food in situations leading to a famine, the increase 
in the money income of one group has often reduced the absolute command 
over food that others may have. 
The second kind is the relativity in generating capabilities from a specific 
bundle of commodities, or from a specific level of real income. As Adam Smith 
has pointed out, in  a country  where everyone has linen clothes and leather 
shoes to wear, someone without them would feel poor in a way a person might 
not in another society in which others too don’t have these things. The ability 
to “appear in public without shame” depends not only on one’s own commod- 
ity bundle (or real income) but also on what others have. 
The third kind is the relativity in evaluating capabilities. What we regard as 
minimally  acceptable  freedoms would tend to depend on what others  stan- 
dardly have. When the standard achievements go up, acceptability may also be 
revised upward. 
Each of these three perspectives brings in relative concerns (and they actu- 
ally do figure in Frank’s arguments), but not for the same reason, nor in the 
same way. Their distinct bearings may be fruitfully separated out in extending 
Frank’s analysis further. For example, if as a result of plan 2 there is a substan- 
tial increase in the money  spent by some on health, then, given the existing 
total facilities, this may reduce the absolute facilities obtained by the others 
who may be competed out (relativity in commanding commodities). This can 
be a significant consideration, particularly in the short run. 
Now consider a case in which this does not happen, perhaps because of the 
expansion of total supply of these facilities. But still the sense of being medi- 
cally “secure” (or of having “state of the art” care) can be unfavorably affected 
by the escalation of care for some, even when the concrete medical facilities 
remain the same for others (relativity in generating capabilities). The capability 
of feeling medically secure does not depend only on the exact medical facili- 
ties the person enjoys, but also on relative positions. 
But even when such a deprivation of capabilities does not occur, it is pos- 
sible that a general expansion of medical care may lead to a change of stan- 
dards in deciding on the minimally acceptable sense of medical security (rela- 
tivity in evaluating capabilities). Each of these types of relations has relevance 
to the subject matter of Frank’s paper. But they have to be distinguished, since 
they operate differently, and because our welfare-economic evaluation of these 
different types of effects may well be quite divergent. 
Frank’s already rich line of analysis can perhaps be somewhat further en- 194  Robert H. Frank 
riched in these ways. However, we must not grumble that Frank has not done 
more, since he has done so much. 
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